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THE TAXATION OF DAMAGES: TAX AND
NON-TAX POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Edward Yoriot
In 1955 the Supreme Court handed down a landmark deci-
sion, Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. ,' in which it held that puni-
tive damages and other windfall recoveries were includable in gross
income under the federal income tax.2 Although the rules for taxa-
tion of damages were reasonably clear prior to this decision, 3 Glen-
shaw Glass resolved the few unsettled areas.4 Since then the law has
changed little5 and the prevailing rules can be summarized briefly:
' Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B. 1968, Columbia
University; J.D. 1971, Harvard Law School.
1 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
2 Although Glenshaw Glass clarified many damage taxation issues (see note 4 infra), its
constitutional basis remains uncertain. The opinion can be interpreted to stand for two
different propositions. On the one hand, the Court may have been broadening the mean-
ing of "income" under the sixteenth amendment to include punitive damages. Alterna-
tively, the Court may have been holding that an income tax on punitive damages is not a
"direct" tax, and is, therefore, constitutional, even if punitive damages are not "income"
within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. For an excellent analysis of this constitu-
tional question, see Wright, The Effect of the Source of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme
Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts, 8 STAN. L. REV. 164 (1956).
1 Shortly after the enactment of the 1913 income tax, Henry Campbell Black accu-
rately prophesied the fundamental rules that later developed for taxing damage awards:
If the cause of action were an injury to property or contract rights, [the judgment]
might be considered as, in some sense at least, a replacement of capital. If it were
for services rendered, the amount of the judgment would clearly be "compensa-
tion," or even "salary" or "fees," though recovered by suit. But a judgment in an
action of tort, as, for example, defamation of character or negligence causing per-
sonal injuries, would never be regarded as a part of one's income in the common
acceptation of the term.
H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE
LAws § 38, at 90 (1913).
For a comprehensive summary of the pre-Glenshaw Glass state of the law, see Plumb,
Income Tax on Gains and Losses in Litigation (pt. 1), 25 CORNELL L.Q. 221 (1940).
4 The taxation of punitive damages and other windfall recoveries was disputed at the
time of Glenshaw Glass. Compare Central R.R. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1935)
(windfalls not taxable) and Telefilm, Inc., 21 T.C. 688 (1954) (punitive damages not tax-
able), rev'd, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 1804 (9th Cir. 1955) with Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v.
United States, 107 F. Supp. 941 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (recovery of insiders' profits taxable). One
commentator has stated that before Glenshaw Glass a taxpayer had at least a 50-50 chance
of excluding treble damages in an antitrust recovery. Wright, A Tax Formula to Restore the
Historical Effects of the Antitrust Treble Damage Provisions, 65 MICH. L. REV. 245, 257-58
(1966).
5 One of the few changes was the enactment in 1969 of I.R.C. § 186 (antitrust dam-
ages and certain other damages). Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 904(a), 83 Stat. 711 (1969). For a
fuller explanation of this provision, see notes 156-65 and accompanying text infra.
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(1) Damages for personal injuries, including damages at-
tributable to loss of earnings or profits, 6 are not taxable.7
(2) Punitive damages are taxable.'
(3) Other "windfall" recoveries are also taxable. 9
(4) The taxation of any other kind of recovery depends on
what the recovery represents.' 0 If the recovery represents
damages for loss of capital," it is taxable only to the extent that
the damages exceed the taxpayer's basis in the capital af-
fected. 12 If the recovery represents lost profits or earn-
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1956).
7 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
8 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a)
(1960).
9 General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955) (recovery of insid-
ers' profits taxable); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (1960).
An interesting question may arise under a settlement or judgment in a class action that
uses the "fluid recovery" technique to allow an individual who is a member of a class at the
time of the recovery to recover against a wrongdoer even though the individual was not a
member of the class at the time of the wrong. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695,
433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). Even if the recovery would normally be nontaxable
as damages on account of personal injury or as a recovery of capital, the damages could be
taxable as a windfall to the individual who recovers but who was not a member of the class
at the time of the injury.
"' Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938) (settlement of will contest not taxable); Ray-
theon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.) (recovery in excess of basis for
injury to goodwill taxable), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944); Vincent v. Commissioner, 219
F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1955) (recovery of dividend income stolen from trust held not taxable to
beneficiary). In Vincent, the taxpayer, who was the beneficiary of a trust, recovered $61,000
from the estate of the trustee who had allegedly embezzled dividend income from the
trust. Because of the embezzlement, the trust itself paid no tax on the dividends. The issue
in the case was whether the taxpayer-beneficiary was taxable on the recovery. The Tax
Court held the recovery taxable as ordinary income since it represented dividend income.
Virginia Hansen Vincent, 18 T.C. 339 (1952). This result is not surprising since the div-
idends would have been taxable to the trust had it received them. Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding that the money was not taxable to the beneficiary
because the trust, not the beneficiary, would have been liable for the tax on the dividends.
11 Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932); High-
land Farms Corp., 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940).
12 Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
779 (1944). Whether the excess is taxable as ordinary income or as capital gain depends on
a number of factors, including whether the damaged asset is a capital asset. See notes 64-73
and accompanying text infra.
If only part of an asset has been damaged, it may be impossible to allocate basis to the
affected part. When allocation is impossible and the recovery does not exceed the total
basis of the asset, some courts have held that no part of the recovery is taxable. See, e.g.,
Strother v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 626, 632-33 (4th Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 287 U.S.
314 (1932). This holding is inconsistent with the apparently universal rule that the tax-
payer bears the burden of proving his basis when an entire asset has been destroyed.
Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779
(1944); Telefilm, Inc., 21 T.C. 688, 695 (1954), rev'd on other grounds, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 1804
(9th Cir. 1955).
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ings-whether past, present, or future-it is fully taxable.' 3
(5) If a recovery is taxable, it must be included in the
income of a cash basis taxpayer in the year of recovery, not in
the year (or years) during which the taxpayer suffered or will
suffer the loss.' 4
(6) Identical rules of taxation apply whether the recovery
results from a judgment or a settlement.' 5
Because the rules for taxing damages are now relatively set-
fled, it should be a fairly simple matter for a lawyer to advise a
client on the taxability of a given recovery.16 Likewise, tax planning
in drafting complaints or settlements should present few problems
for plaintiffs' attorneys in damage actions. 17 Yet despite general
agreement on which damages are taxable, there is still little consen-
sus regarding the tax policies that justify the exclusion of certain
recoveries from income.' 8 This Article analyzes policy justifications
for the present law and recommends alternative rules that will
more appropriately effectuate rational tax policies for the inclusion
or exclusion of damages from income. Two concluding sections
attempt to show how these alternative rules would generally reflect
and reinforce the policies of tort and contract law in the area of
damages.
I
THE Macomber DEFINITION OF INCOME
The 1918 Revenue Act excluded from gross income
"[a]mounts received, through accident or health insurance or
under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal
In cases of partial destruction, the basis of the asset will be reduced by the amount of
the recovery that is nontaxable. Inaja Land Co., 9 T.C. 727 (1947).
13 Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
779 (1944); Nathan Agar, 29 T.C.M. (P-H) 137 (1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961).
Interest on a judgment, even if the judgment itself is nontaxable, is taxable. Theodore
Pope Riddle, 27 B.T.A. 1339 (1933).
14 Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
11 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) exempts "damages received (whether by suit or agreement)." See
Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
779 (1944).
16 Cutler, Taxation of the Proceeds of Litigation, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 470 (1957) (summary of
post-Glenshaw Glass rules governing taxation of damages).
17 See McCaffrey, Taxpayer's Choice in Damage Suit, 29 TAXES 879 (1951) (suggestions for
drafting complaint or settlement agreement to minimize taxes payable on recovery). See also
Fouts, Payments Received in Settlement of Litigation and Claims, N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 555
(1967).
18 For a discussion of various theories that have been suggested to justify the exclusion
of certain damages from income, see notes 39-142 and accompanying text infra.
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injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received
whether by suit or agreement on account of such injury or
sickness."'19 Not surprisingly, the Solicitor of Internal Revenue
sought to limit this statutory exclusion by its terms shortly after its
enactment. He ruled in 1919 that money received in a libel action
was taxable, 2" and in 1920 that a recovery for alienation of a wife's
affections was also taxable on the grounds that the exclusion of
"personal injuries" under the statute applied to "physical injuries
only. ' 1 Since the Service's position was not unreasonable, it
seemed, for a time at least, that all damage recoveries except those
specifically exempted by the statute would be included in gross
income.2 2
In 1920 the Supreme Court decided Eisner v. Macomber,2 3
which defined income as "the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined. 2 4 Though the Macomber facts did
not remotely involve damages, 25 the holding caused a complete
reversal in the Service's attitude toward the taxation of damage
recoveries; two years after the decision the Solicitor of Internal
Revenue ruled that damages for alienation of affections, for defa-
mation of personal character, or for the surrender of the custody
of a minor child were no longer taxable because there was "no
gain, and therefore no income" from such recoveries. 26 The So-
licitor did not offer a convincing policy justification for these new
exclusions 2 '-the items were excluded merely because they did not
fall within the meaning of the term "income" as used in the
statute.28 This rationale seems questionable. Congress would not
have needed to legislate a specific exclusion for damages in com-
pensation for personal injuries if it had been settled that such
damages were not "income" in the statutory sense.29
19 Ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066 (1918) (now I.R.C. § 104(a)).
20 S. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919).
21 S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920).
22 For an analysis of this early Service position, see Knickerbocker, The Income Tax
Treatment of Damages: A Study in the Difficulties of the Income Concept, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 429,
430-31 (1961).
23 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
24 Id. at 207. This language originated in an earlier Supreme Court opinion, Stratton's
Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).
25 The case involved the government's attempt to tax a stock dividend.
26 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922).
27 The Solicitor stated only that the damages were nontaxable because "the right in-
vaded is a personal right and is in no way transferable." Id. at 93.
28 The Solicitor relied on Macomber in holding that "there is no gain, and therefore no
income" when such damages are received. Id.
29 The legislative history of the 1918 Revenue Act indicates that Congress was unsure
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Despite the dubious grounds for extending the Macomber
definition to the area of damage recoveries, the Solicitor's ap-
proach was supported, and even extended, by most of the subse-
quent cases and rulings. Damages received in an annulment of a
marriage procured by fraud were held not taxable income; 30 sub-
sidies paid to a railroad company by the Republic of Cuba were
held excludable because they "were not made for services rendered
or to be rendered";31 damages paid for loss of life were held "not
embraced in the general concept of the term 'income' -1;32 punitive
damages were also held excludable for the same reason. 33 As late
as 1954 the Service itself reaffirmed this reasoning in ruling that
payments for loss of life were excludable because they were "not
embraced in the general concept of the term 'income.' "34
Although many of the decisions and rulings applied the Ma-
comber definition literally to exclude recoveries, the courts stopped
short of excluding all types of recoveries. Damages for lost profits
or earnings, for example, were held taxable, unless the damages
resulted from a personal injury. 5 Yet if a recovery is not
"income"-when it is not a gain from labor or capital or from both
combined-then lost profit recoveries are arguably excludable
since they represent a gain that failed to materialize because the
injured party was prevented from performing services or from en-
gaging in a profitable enterprise. Indeed, very often the gravamen
of the injured party's complaint is that he was prevented from
realizing gains from labor or capital because of the wrongdoer's
conduct. Nonetheless, the cases uniformly held that damages for
loss of earnings or profits were taxable, indicating that the courts
were not willing to carry the Macomber definition to its furthest
possible extension. 6
whether damages in compensation for personal injuries were income: "Under the present
law it is doubtful whether... damages received on account of [personal] injuries or sickness,
are required to be included in gross income." H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10
(1918).
31 I.T. 1852, 11-2 C.B. 66 (1923).
31 Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 633 (1925). One commentator has questioned
the Court's reliance on the Macomber definition of income to exclude these subsidies. Wright,
supra note 2, at 177-78.
32 I.T. 2420, VII-2 C.B. 123, 124 (1928).
33 Highland Farms Corp., 42 B.T.A. 1314, 1322 (1940).
3" Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180.
" See Plumb, supra note 3, at 223-24.
36 Cases involving damages for patent infringement provide an interesting example. In
such cases the damages of the injured party are often not computed with reference to profits
lost as a result of the infringement, but are instead measured by the profits that the in-
fringer made as a result of the infringement. See, e.g., Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Latchum,
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Because many of the early cases and rulings exempting dam-
ages were based not on tax policy, but simply on the Supreme
Court's definition of the word "income," they shed little light on
the policies justifying the exclusion of certain damage recoveries.
Furthermore, when the Supreme Court decided to revise its defini-
tion of the word "income," as it did sub silentio in Glenshaw Glass,
37
the intellectual support for many of the earlier holdings on dam-
ages collapsed.38
II
THE SECTION 104(a)(2) EXEMPTION
A. Emotional Factors Behind the Exemption
The tax exemption for damages received as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness was first enacted in 1918.39 Yet, even
now, the policy reasons for the exclusion are unclear. This has
prompted many commentators to conclude that the exemption is
impossible to justify on logical grounds, and that it is rooted in-
stead in "emotional and traditional" factors. 41 Under this view the
exemption represents "the feeling that the taxation of recoveries
carved from pain and suffering is offensive, and the victim is more
to be pitied rather than taxed."14 1
Although sympathy for the injured party is undoubtedly one
reason for the exemption, this explanation is, as the commentators
44 F. Supp. 436 (D. Del.), aff'd, 131 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1942) (per curiam). Although it is
difficult to square taxing such damages with the Macomber definition of income, courts have
held that such damages are taxable. Id.; W.W. Sly Mfg. Co., 24 B.T.A. 65 (1931). In Triplex,
the taxpayer also argued that because the infringer was taxed on the profits he improperly
received, the injured party should not be taxed on the same profits. 44 F. Supp. at 438. The
court rejected this argument in holding that the tax liability of the injured party was not
affected by the liability of the infringer, even if the very same profits would be taxed twice.
In any event, because the infringer receives a deduction for the amount he pays to the
injured party, the profits are not taxed twice. For a general discussion of the deductibility of
damage payments, see Plumb, Income Tax on Gains and Losses in Litigation (pt. 2), 26 CORNELL
L.Q. 16 (1940).
11 See Wright, supra note 2, at 179-201 (summary of developments before Glenslaw Glass
that facilitated Court's tacit overruling of Macomber in damage area).
38 Despite the erosion of intellectual support for some of these holdings, they remain
good law. The Service has, for example, largely reaffirmed Solicitor's.Opinion 132. Rev. Rul.
74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
3 See note 19 supra.
"' Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 614, 626 (1952); Comment, Tax Treatment
of Post-termination Personal Injury Settlements, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1237 (1973).
41 Harnett, supra note 40, at 627.
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admit, neither legally nor logically convincing.42 Even assuming
arguendo that it would be offensive to tax a recovery for pain and
suffering, this rationale does not justify extending the exemption
to damages for defamation of a personal nature,43 damages for
breach of promise,44 and damages for fraud and deceit 45-none
of which is likely to involve personal anguish.
On the other hand, if sympathy for the victim is the true basis
for the exemption, the exclusion does not go far enough. Although
one commentator has argued that injury to one's business reputa-
tion may be a "less serious blow to the victim, '" 46 such an injury can
be as emotionally upsetting as damage to personal reputation. 47
Some individuals treasure their personal reputations; others, their
business reputations. That the tax system favors one over the other
is a puzzle. 48
B. Difficulty of Allocation
Even if the exemption for personal injury recoveries can be
explained as an emotional response to the plight of injured tax-
payers, the blanket exemption for recoveries of lost earnings or
profits cannot be so justified because the injured party receives
tax-free that which would have been taxable but for the injury.49 It
41 Id.; Comment, supra note 40.
43 C.A. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
44 Lyle McDonald, 9 B.T.A. 1340 (1928).
45 I.T. 1852, 11-2 C.B. 66 (1923).
46 See Comment, supra note 40, at 1238 n.9.
47 The leading early case on damages for defamation apparently did not distinguish
between personal reputation and business reputation. C.A. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
At least one early commentator thought damages for injury to both were nontaxable. Plumb,
supra note 3, at 234 n.80.
48 Being called a Communist, for example, may damage one's personal reputation,
business reputation, or both. Damages for the latter are taxable (Paul Draper, 26 T.C. 201
(1956)), while damages for the former are exempt (I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)), even though the
emotional upset suffered may be the same in both cases.
4 9 See note 6 and accompanying text supra. A recent ruling represents an unusual excep-
tion to the rule that damages for lost earnings due to a personal injury are not included in
gross income. Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32. An employer was required to divide a
specified sum among employees who suffered a loss as a result of the employer's dis-
criminatory employment practices. The amount paid to each employee was based on a
formula that considered the difference between the employee's actual earnings and what his
earnings would have been had he not been discriminated against. It is difficult to under-
stand why the payment is not exempt under § 104(a)(2) as damages received on account of a
personal injury, especially since the Service ruled in 1955 that payments made by the United
States under the War Claims Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2005(d)(2)(A)-(B) (1970) (originally
enacted as ch. 826, § 6, 62 Stat. 1244 (1948), as amended, ch. 167, § 2, 66 Stat. 48 (1952)) to
compensate for violation of a taxpayer's rights as a German prisoner of war were nontaxa-
ble. Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213; see Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25. Apparently the
distinction is that the payments in the former ruling were computed with reference to the
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has been suggested that damages for lost earnings are exempt be-
cause it would be difficult for the taxpayer to allocate between
damages for lost earnings and nontaxable damages such as pain
and suffering.511 The blanket exemption does, of course, eliminate
the administrative difficulty of separating the various elements of a
recovery. Yet taxpayers and courts frequently confront the prob-
lem in allocating damages for a business injury. 5' In a typical busi-
ness injury situation, recovery may consist of damages for lost prof-
its, damages for injury to capital (goodwill), and punitive damages.
Of these, only damages for injury to goodwill are excludable, and
only to the extent of the taxpayer's basis in the goodwill affected. 52
To obtain an exclusion, therefore, the taxpayer must establish the
amount of recovery allocable to,55 and his basis in, the goodwill. 54
Likewise, it is frequently necessary to allocate damages in the
personal injury context.55 Sometimes an allocation must be made
between compensatory (nontaxable) and punitive (taxable) dam-
ages. 6 Occasionally the Service and a taxpayer disagree about
whether damages compensate for personal injury (nontaxable) or
for loss of earnings in a business context (taxable).5 7 Since courts
already allocate damages for tax purposes in both business and
taxpayer's lost earnings. But under § 104(a)(2) the crucial question is whether the injury is a
personal injury, not whether damages are computed by reference to lost earnings that would
otherwise be taxable. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text infra.
o Comment, supra note 40, at 1237.
The difficulties of allocating among types of damages in a business context are well
illustrated by the opinions of the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit in Ione Thomson, 34
T.C.M. (P-H) 1317 (1965), aff'd, 406 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1969).
52 See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
53 The taxpayer usually has the burden of proof on this issue. Sager Glove Corp. v.
Commissioner, 311 F.2d 210, 211 (7th Cir. 1962). The Tax Court has occasionally ruled that
a reasonable approximation of the recovery portion allocable to goodwill must be made
when the evidence is unclear. See, e.g., Telefilm, Inc., 21 T.C. 688 (1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 1804 (9th Cir. 1955). This approach considerably relaxes the
taxpayer's burden of proof. It is clear, however, that the form of a transaction will not
conclusively determine the nature of the recovery. Cf. Estate of J.T. Longino, 32 T.C. 904,
906 (1959) (payments taxable as ordinary income even though settlement agreement drafted
in form of sale).
In the case of antitrust recoveries, the Service has eased the taxpayer's burden of proof
considerably when the issue is whether the payments received represent compensatory
or punitive damages. See Rev. Proc. 67-33, 1967-2 C.B. 659.
'4 The taxpayer has the burden of proof on this issue. See note 12 supra.
" See, e.g., cases cited in note 57 infra. A recent commentary reviewing the cases con-
cludes that courts should require more proof from taxpayers who claim that a settlement
represents nontaxable damages for personal injury. Comment, supra note 40, at 1252-53.
51 Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.
" See, e.g., Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965); Dudley G. Seay,
58 T.C. 32 (1972); Leo Dalbo, 38 T.C.M. (P-H) 1270 (1969); Nathan Agar, 29 T.C.M.
(P-H) 137 (1960).
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personal injury contexts, the blanket exclusion for all damages for
personal injury, including loss of earnings, cannot be justified sole-
ly on the grounds of administrative convenience.
III
RECOVERY OF CAPITAL
An early income tax decision, Burnet v. Logan,58 established
that the recovery of capital is not a taxable event. 59 A similar prin-
ciple applies when damages represent compensation for loss of
capital. 6
A. The Business Asset
When a taxpayer purchases a business, part of the purchase
price can be allocated to goodwill. If a tortfeasor, e.g., an unfair
competitor, destroys all or part of the goodwill, then, given the
holding of Burnet v. Logan,6 1 the damages received as compensa-
tion for destruction of the goodwill are not taxed,62 except to the
extent that the damages exceed the taxpayer's basis in the good-
will.6 3
Determining appropriate taxation on the excess is a more dif-
ficult question. Usually the gain derived from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset64 like goodwill, 65 held for more than nine
months, 66 is long-term capital gain, 67 and is taxed at favorable
rates. 6  Even in the absence of a sale or exchange, the gain on the
involuntary conversion or theft of a depreciable asset may be tax-
able as a long-term capital gain. 69 But if goodwill is injured by the
wrongful conduct of a tortfeasor, there is a strong possibility that
the excess of the recovery over the taxpayer's basis will be taxable
56 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
5 9 Id. at 411-14. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920).
66 See notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
61 283 U.S. at 412-13.
'2 State Fish Corp., 48 T.C. 465, 477 (1967).
11 Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 779 (1944).
64 I.R.C. § 1221.
1S Rev. Rul. 55-79, 1955-1 C.B. 370.
66 I.R.C. §§ 1222(3), 1223. For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1977, the
holding period has been increased to one year. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 1402, 90 Stat. 1731.
67 I.R.C. § 1222(3).
68 I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1202. Capital gains are subject to the minimum tax on items of tax
preference. Id. § 57(a)(9).
69 1d. § 1231.
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as ordinary income, since there has been no sale or exchange 7" and
goodwill is not a depreciable asset.71
The usual requirement of a sale or exchange for a transac-
tion to qualify for capital gain treatment has been persuasively
criticized.72 The rule makes even less sense in the damage recovery
area, since a taxpayer may be taxed at ordinary income rates on a
gain which would have been taxed as a capital gain had he sold the
asset. Since there is no justification for taxing a gain more heavily
when the taxpayer has been compelled against his will to realize
it,73 Congress should provide that any gain from damages awarded
upon the destruction of a capital asset be taxable as a capital gain.
B. Recoveiy of Expenditures
If a taxpayer incurs expenses as a result of an injury and the
wrongdoer reimburses him for those expenses, the amount of the
reimbursement is not taxable7 4 unless the taxpayer took a deduc-
tion for the expenses in an earlier taxable year.75 In a leading case,
71 One commentator has suggested that the excess of the recovery over the injured
party's basis in the goodwill should be taxable as ordinary income. Cutler, supra note 16, at
475 n.29. This is clearly correct under current law, given the "sale or exchange" requirement
for favorable capital gains treatment. I.R.C. § 1222(3). See Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak
Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249-50 (1941). A number of leading cases treat the gain as
ordinary income. See, e.g., Harold S. Smith, 50 T.C. 273, 285 (1968); Ralph A. Boatman, 32
T.C. 1188, 1192 (1959). Some cases, apparently disregarding the sale or exchange require-
ment, treat the excess as capital gain. E.g. Big Four Industries, Inc., 40 T.C. 1055, 1060
(1963). See R.J. Durkee, 18 T.C.M. (P-H) 610, 612 (1949). Under current law these later cases
are probably wrong.
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956).
72 Note, The Elements of a Section 117 "Sale or Exchange," 53 COL ui. L. REv. 976, 990-91
(1953).
7' Indeed, it is arguable that a gain on an involuntary conversion should be taxed less
heavily. See note 92 and accompanying text infra.
"' See Edward H. Clark, 40 B.T.A. 333, 335 (1939), acq. 1957-1 C.B. 4; I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2).
75 I.R.C. § 104(a); Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 23. The inclusion of the reimburse-
ment is defensible on the grounds that the taxpayer, in effect, understated his taxable
income in the earlier year by taking the deduction. Since the annual accounting principle
prohibits reopening the earlier year, the reimbursement should be taxable when the tax-
payer receives it. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brook Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
One decision involving a damage recovery probably improperly allowed exclusion of a
reimbursement of expenses even though the taxpayer deducted the expenses in an earlier
year. See Cox v. Kraemer, 88 F. Supp. 835 (D. Conn. 1948). If, however, the taxpayer has
received no tax benefit from the deduction-e.g., if he had no taxable income against
which to offset the deduction-the reimbursement will probably be excludable. See Alice
Phelan Sullivan v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 401-02 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (dictum) (tax-benefit
exception to usual rule of inclusion of previously deducted items supported); California &
Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 235, 237-39 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (reim-
bursement of unconstitutional taxes held nontaxable since at time of payment of taxes
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Edward H. Clark,7 6 the taxpayer overpaid his federal income taxes
because of his counsel's erroneous tax advice. When the lawyer
reimbursed the taxpayer for the overpayment, the Service sought
to tax the reimbursement. The Board of Tax Appeals held for the
taxpayer, in part because the taxpayer was no better off economi-
cally than he would have been if the lawyer had not made the
mistake. 77 A number of subsequent Internal Revenue Service rul-
ings have endorsed this reasoning. 78 The theory of this line of
cases and rulings is sound. When a taxpayer is reimbursed for an
expense that he incurred because of an injury, he is simply being
made whole without any economic gain. In a sense, such a recovery
is compensation for a loss that impaired the injured party's capital
and, like other recoveries for injury to capital, 79 should not be
taxable.8
C. Human Capital
Some authorities have suggested that personal injury re-
coveries are, in effect, recoveries for injury to capital8 because the
taxpayer was tax-exempt entity, and therefore not entitled to deduct them); I.R.C. § 111;
Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1 (1956).
76 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq. 1957-1 C.B. 4.
7 See id. at 335. The Board also relied on the now questionable Macomber definition of
income. See notes 19-38 and accompanying textsupra.
7
'See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-279, 1960-2 C.B. 11 (reimbursement of relocation expenses
not taxable); Rev. Rul. 57-60, 1957-1 C.B. 25, modified, Rev. Rul. 60-280, 1960-2 C.B. 12
(school board's required reimbursement of transportation expenses not income to parent).
7' See notes 11 & 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
" Under this theory the taxpayer usually has no gain because his "basis" is the amount
of expenses that he incurred. If his recovery for the expenses exceeds the amount actually
expended, the excess should be taxable. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
8' In Glenshaw Glass, the Court interpreted the Service's position to be that personal
injuries were "nontaxable on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of capi-
tal." 348 U.S. at 432 n.8. The Court relied in part on Solicitor's Opinion 132, 1-1 C.B. 92
(1922), to support this finding. In that opinion, the Solicitor did not rely on a return of
capital theory; instead, he stated that damages for invasion of a personal right should not
be taxable because there could be "no correct estimate of the money value of the invaded
rights." Id. at 93. The validity of this reasoning is doubtful in light of the subsequent
decision in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), in which the taxpayer used shares of
stock to satisfy his wife's marital claims against him. The government argued that the ap-
preciation in the value of the stock during ownership was taxable to the taxpayer. The
taxpayer argued that the appreciation was not taxable because the value of the marital
rights relinquished in return for the stock was indeterminable. The Court held for the
government on the ground that the value of the wife's rights could be assumed to be equal
to the value of the property accepted in exchange for those rights.
Similar reasoning would support a finding that the amount of a damage settlement (or
of a jury award) in a personal injury action is a fair approximation of the value of the
invaded rights. After Davis, therefore, the difficulty of valuing rights invaded should not,
in itself, be a bar to taxation of a personal injury recovery.
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human body or an individual's reputation are arguably forms of
"capital." In C.A. Hawkins,8 2 the Board of Tax Appeals held that
damages for personal defamation were not taxable on the grounds
that such damages represented an attempt to "make the plaintiff
whole as before the injury. '83 The Solicitor of Internal Revenue,
interpreting an earlier opinion of the Attorney General exempting
the proceeds of an insurance policy, opined that "the human body
is a kind of capital" and "the proceeds of the insurance policy really
[represent] a conversion of the capital lost through the injury. '8 4
There are several objections to this reasoning. First, the hu-
man capital argument does not explain why personal injury dam-
ages that are clearly allocable to loss of earnings are not tax-
able."' If the analogy to a nontaxable return of capital is correct,
then the statutory exemption 6 should not include lost earnings87
which, unlike a return of capital, would be taxable when received.
In addition, if a damage recovery does indeed compensate for the
destruction of human capital, it would seem that the excess of
recovery over the taxpayer's basis in the human capital should be
taxable. Certainly it would be difficult, if not impossible, to assign a
cost basis to human capital. 8 But the.difficulty of assigning a basis
to human capital might necessitate taxation of the entire recovery,
since the sale of an asset that has a zero basis is fully taxable. 89
In no other tax situation is an individual allowed to use his
basis in human capital to reduce taxable gain.91' Admittedly, the
82 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
81 Id. at 1025. The Board also supported the exclusion on the grounds that damages
for defamation are not "income" under the Macomber definition. Id. at 1024. See notes
23-29 and accompanying text supra.
84 S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920). The British apparently exempt damages for personal
injury on a type of human capital theory: "[A] person whose earning capacity is wholly or
partly destroyed loses the whole or part of a capital asset. ... Dworkin, Damages and
Tax-A Comparative Survey (pt. 1), 1967 BRIT. TAx REV. 315, 328 (emphasis added).
8' See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
86 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
81 It is curious that the British exemption of damages for lost earnings has apparently
been defended on the human capital theory. See Dworkin, supra note 84, at 328 (British
theory criticized).
88 See Plumb, supra note 3, at 234. The problem of determining basis in human capital
may arise in the context of a transfer of bodily parts. For an amusing analysis of the tax
issues involved in such transfers, see Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73
COLU M. L. REV. 842 (1973). The student commentator concludes that a likely outcome
regarding the tax consequences of such transfers is "that the Commissioner and the courts
will find these expenditures non-capitalizable, hold that the entire body has a zero basis,
and tax the entire proceeds of any anatomical sale." Id. at 855.
89 See Harnett, supra note 40, at 627.
9" Living expenses, comprising most of one's basis in human capital, are nondeductible
under current law. See I.R.C. § 262. Educational expenses are also nondeductible. Treas-.
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fact that the victim is forced to convert his human capital into cash
or other property distinguishes the personal injury case. As a gen-
eral rule, however, the tax consequences of an involuntary conver-
sion of property are no different from those of a voluntary sale, 91
unless Congress specifically provides for more favorable tax re-
sults. 92 And there is no evidence that Congress intended the ex-
emption for personal injury recoveries as a specific exception to the
tax rules governing realizations from involuntary conversions.
93
D. Compensation for a Nontaxable Item
The most convincing argument for part of the exclusion is that
damages intended to compensate for losses that the taxpayer
would have enjoyed tax-free should also be tax-free.94 One com-
mentator has argued that an early Supreme Court opinion allow-
ing a wife to exclude alimony from her income was correct because
alimony represents "the portion of the husband's estate or income to
the enjoyment of which the wife is equitably entitled," '95 and which
she would have enjoyed tax-free, but for the divorce. 96 Under
current law the exclusion from the wife's income of a lump-sum
marital settlement 97 might be defended on the same theory.
Other examples suggest that this reasoning has considerable
force. Damages for defamation of character are exempt 98 arguably
because a taxpayer would enjoy his reputation tax-free; damages
for" invasion of privacy are exempt99 because maintaining one's
Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37. The Tax Court has ruled, in at least one
case, that a taxpayer may not depreciate the cost of receiving an engineering degree. See,
e.g., Nathaniel A. Denman, 48 T.C. 439, 444-46 (1967).
91 The Internal Revenue Code provides for nonrecognition of gain on an involuntary
conversion of property only if the taxpayer meets the narrow requirements of I.R.C.
§ 1033. See, e.g., Clifton Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 719, 721-22 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 921 (1963).
92 See I.R.C. § 1033(a) (nonrecognition of gain on involuntary conversion of property
under certain circumstances); id. § 1231(a) (capital gain or ordinary loss on involuntary
conversion of certain property). Section 1033 does not allow a permanent exemption from
taxation because it provides for a basis adjustment that will usually result in a gain when the
property is sold (assuming the property retains its value at the time of the conversion). I.R.C.
§ 1033(b).
" See H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918).
9'See United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 311 (1960) (concurring opinion, Frank-
furter, J.).
95 See Plumb, supra note 3, at 235 (emphasis in original).
96 Under current law, alimony-in contrast to a lump-sum settlement-is taxable to the
wife and deductible by the husbana. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215.
97 I.R.C. § 71(c).
98 C.A. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
99 See Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920, 923-24 (E.D. Tenn. 1959) (dictum)
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privacy is not a taxable event." So, too, damages in compensation
for a violation of an individual's civil rights should not be taxed
because the injured party would not have been taxed if his rights
had been respected.1 " This argument is more persuasive than the
human capital argument because it eliminates the problem of com-
puting basis in human capital. Nonetheless, like the human capital
argument, it also fails to explain why damages for loss of earnings
are exempt, since the earnings would be taxable income if received.
IV
BUNCHING OF INCOME
A. Periodicity
One line of cases suggests that damages may not be taxable
because, as a periodical return to the taxpayer, they do not consti-
tute "income." An early Supreme Court opinion, for example, jus-
tified the exemption for the proceeds of a life insurance policy in
the following terms:
The benefit to be gained by death has no periodicity. It is a
substitution of money value for something permanently lost
either in a house, a ship, or a life. Assuming without deciding
that Congress could call the proceeds of such indemnity, income,
and validly tax it as such, we think that in view of the popular
(§ 104(a)(2) exclusion of damages for invasion of privacy supported); 1 J. MERTENS, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 5.11, at 39 (1974).
1 But if one contracts away his right of privacy, the amount of compensation he
receives in return is taxable. See Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962)
(dictum); Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (dictum). Under the
statute these decisions are probably correct because payments received in advance for giving
up one's privacy are not "damages received . ..on account of personal injuries." I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (emphasis added). The major factual distinction between these cases is that the tort
victim is compelled to settle for damages while the contractor voluntarily chooses to give up
his right of privacy. See note 93 and accompanying text supra. Yet the current rules may
encourage a prospective victim not to contract away his privacy in the expectation that his
privacy will be invaded, thereby giving him an action for tax-exempt damages. The Ehrlich
court analogized payments for invasion of privacy to taxable payments for a covenant not to
compete. 52 F. Supp. at 809. The payments are distinguishable, however, because a
covenantor would normally be taxed on the profits earned from competition, while an in-
dividual's privacy right is not taxable.
'" See Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213 (prisoner-of-war payments not income). But if
damages are computed by reference to the taxpayer's lost earnings (e.g., in cases of employ-
ment discrimination), the Service takes the position that the damages are taxable; the earn-
ings would have been received and would have been taxable but for the discrimination. See
Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32. Theoretically this distinction is convincing, but under
current law the Service's position may be unfounded. See note 49 supra.
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conception of the life insurance as resulting in a single addition
of a total sum to the resources of the beneficiary, and not in a
periodical return, such a purpose on its part should be express,
as it certainly is not here.10 2
The Court's argument rests largely on the idea that "a person who
receives value only sporadically is not in the same circumstances as
a person who receives the identical value from a recurring
source."'1 3 At least one decision involving damages explicitly en-
dorsed this argument in holding that damages for defamation were
not income,11 4 and the early cases'115 holding that windfalls did not
constitute income seem to rest on the same premise.
Despite these early decisions, the notion that periodical returns
do not constitute income was persuasively criticized: "[I]t may be
concluded with equal logic that the [periodical] receipts should be
taxed at an even higher rate, for the recipient does not depend
upon them for subsistence .... In addition, no distinction is made
between the sporadic income of a prize fighter and the stable in-
come of a college professor."'11 6 With the Glenshaw Glass decision,
the Supreme Court rejected its earlier reasoning in holding that
items such as punitive damages and other windfalls are income
even though they are not received on a regular basis. 11 7
B. Consequences of Income-Bunching
The federal income tax has a highly progressive rate schedule
with marginal rates on taxable income for individuals beginning at
fourteen' percent and increasing up to a maximum of seventy
percent.""' The progressivity of federal income tax rates creates a
serious problem for the taxpayer who receives a lump-sum damage
settlement or judgment in one year, which compensates for the loss
102 United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189, 195 (1924).
10 Comment, Taxation of Found Property and Other Windfalls, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 748, 753
(1953).
104 C.A. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927).
1"5 Central R.R. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1935); Telefilm, Inc., 21 T.C.
688 (1954), rev'd, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 1804 (9th Cir. 1955).
1" Comment, supra note 103, at 753 (footnotes omitted).
107 The periodicity argument would suggest that some other items of income, such as
gains on the casual sale of property, should be exempt, since they are realized only sporadi-
cally. See L. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 25
(1951).
10" I.R.C. § 1. The rate for corporations is currently either 20%, 22%, or 48%; for
taxable years ending after December 31, 1977, the rate is either 22% or 48%. See id. § 11.
Because the tax rate for corporations is less progressive than the rate for individuals, the
deleterious effects of progression are not as marked.
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of earnings or profits over a period of years. Consider this highly
simplified example." 9 Suppose that an unfair competitor destroys
the business of an individual, unmarried taxpayer, whose business
earnings had been $50,000 annually through the 1975 taxable
year. The injury causes his business income to decline to zero in
1976. The wrongdoer agrees to settle with the injured party for a
sum which includes $250,000 in anticipated profits from 1976 to
1980. The $250,000 is paid in 1977. Since the settlement is taxed
entirely in the year it is received,"" the injured party's tax liability
on the lump-sum settlement is $158,090."' By contrast, if the
business had not been injured and the taxpayer had continued to
earn $50,000 each year from 1976 through 1980, his total tax
liability would have been $100,950.112 Thus, the lump-sum settle-
ment cost the taxpayer an additional tax liability of $57,140." 3
The relationship of this "bunching of income"'"1 4 problem to
the periodicity argument is apparent. When a taxpayer receives
several years' worth of earnings in one year, a major tax inequity
results. It is possible, although not likely, 15 that the exemption for
damages in compensation for personal injury, including loss of
earnings, represents a recognition by Congress that in a progres-
sive tax system it is unfair to tax in one year a settlement that
compensates for earnings over an extended period. If the income-
bunching problem is a justification for favorable tax treatment,
however, then the exemption arguably does not go far enough,
since it does not embrace damages for loss of earnings caused by
a business injury.' 1 6
The Internal Revenue Code now contains income-averaging
1 9 This example assumes that the taxpayer has no income other than the damage
recovery and that he has no deductions to offset the damages for lost profits. Although this
is obviously an unrealistic set of facts, the argument would remain the same unless the dollar
value of deductions in the year of the recovery was sufficient to offset the effects of progres-
sion. This would be an atypical situation.
""o See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
111 I.R.C. § l(c) (tax on first $100,000 is $53,090 plus 70% of the excess).
112 Id. (tax on first $44,000 is $16,590 plus 60% of the excess or a total of $20,190
per year).
113 For the purpose of analysis, this example ignores the possible advantages to the
taxpayer of having received the money in 1977 rather than from 1976 through 1980.
114 At least two commentators have discussed the income-bunching problem. See
Cutler, supra note 16, at 476-80; Harnett, supra note 40, at 614-15. The Cutler article,
however, pre-dates the current averaging provisions of the Code (I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305). See
notes 117-30 and accompanying text infra.
115 The legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919)
(repealed 1939), reveals no such congressional intent. See H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9-10 (1918).
I16 See note 13 and accompanying textsupra.
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provisions that lessen the unfavorable tax consequences of a lump-
sum settlement.' 1 7 Although these provisions now prescribe averag-
ing for all types of income, not only damages, they were designed
in part to mitigate the tax inequity caused by income-bunching
damage settlements and judgments. 1 8 The averaging provisions
aid the taxpayer to some extent, but they still do not reduce tax
liability to the pre-injury level. One problem is that averaging is
not available to corporations." 9 Moreover, the averaging provi-
sions do not entirely eliminate the deleterious effects of progres-
sion, even for individuals. 2 " Thus, in the example discussed
above, the averaging provisions would reduce the taxpayer's liabil-
ity to $131,400' 21--less than the one-year tax liability ($158,090),
but still far in excess of the $100,950 he would have paid over the
five-year earnings period had he not been injured. 22
The averaging provisions do not completely eliminate the in-
equity caused by progression for a number of reasons. First, the
provisions only allow a taxpayer to average the excess of his income
for the taxable year over 120 percent of his average base-period
income.' 23 To the extent of twenty percent of base-period income,
therefore, the averaging provisions are inoperative. Second, and
more important in the example under discussion, the settlement is
117 I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305.
118 See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 757, § 721, 54 Stat. 986 (averaging ofjudgment
or award for excess profits tax purposes); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 63, § 119(a), 58 Stat.
39 (adding § 107(d)) (now I.R.C. § 1303) (averaging of settlement or judgment for back pay
for income tax purposes). See Cutler, supra note 16, at 484-97, for an excellent survey of the
legislative history of the averaging provisions prior to the adoption of the current provisions.
119 See I.R.C. § 1301 ("If an eligible individual .... ") (emphasis added).
121 Income-bunching is usually not as serious a problem for a corporation. First, the
corporate rates, currently either 20%, 22%, or 48%, are not as steeply progressive as the
rates on the income of an individual. Second, the 48% rate currently begins at $50,000 of
taxable income ($25,000 for taxable years ending after December 31, 1977) and remains at
48% regardless of the amount of the corporation's income. See note 108 supra.
121 Under the averaging provisions, the individual's tax for 1977 is equal to five times
the increase in tax under I.R.C. § I that would result from adding 20% of his "averageable
income" to 120% of "average base period income." I.R.C. § 1301.
In the example under discussion, the "base period" is 1973 through 1976. Id.
§ 1302(c)(2). "Average base period income" is $37,500 (profits of $50,000 a year during
1973, 1974, and 1975 averaged over the "based period"). Id. § 1302(b)(1). One hundred and
twenty percent of "average base period" is $45,000 and "averageable income" is $205,000
(1977 income of $250,000 less "average base period income"). Id. § 1302(a)(1). Twenty
percent of "averageable income" is $41,000. The tax on $86,000 ($45,000 plus $41,000)
is $45,870; the tax on $45,000 is $19,590. Id. § 1(c). The "increase in tax" under
§ 1301 is $26,280 and the.individual's tax liability for 1977 is five times that increase
($131,400).
122 See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
122 I.R.C. § 1301.
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averaged back over the four years from 1973 through 1976,124
which includes a period (1973-1975) before the unfair competition
took place, and during which the taxpayer was making his usual
annual profits of $50,000. To the extent that the settlement is
thrown back into his high income years, the advantages of averag-
ing are reduced. Finally, the current averaging provisions do not
allow the taxpayer to average forward over the future years for
which he is receiving compensation. 125 In the example given,
$150,000 of the settlement is meant to compensate for future earn-
ings during 1978, 1979, and 1980-years to which the taxpayer is
not entitled to average.
The averaging provisions, therefore, do not entirely eliminate
the inequity resulting from the progressive taxation of lump-sum
recoveries for loss of earnings. Of course, other taxpayers--e.g.,
employees who receive large bonuses or taxpayers who realize un-
usual capital gains-are sometimes unfairly treated under the
present provisions for averaging income. In the case of damage
recoveries, however, the taxpayer's claim to more favorable treat-
ment than under the general rule is stronger because the taxpayer
has been forced to realize income in one year as a result of the
wrongful intervention of a third party. Under such circumstances,
his claim to total relief from the effects of progression is rather
compelling. 126
An alternative to the present limited averaging of damages
would allow the taxpayer to allocate the recovery to the taxable
years during which his income was or will be reduced because of
the injury. It is unlikely, however, that the Service would accept
this solution since it would offend the annual accounting principle
and defeat its administrative advantages.' 27 Not only would taxes
for prior years have to be recomputed, but the computation and
payment of tax on that part of the recovery allocable to future
earnings would have to be deferred until the years affected. 28 As a
124 Id. § 1302(c)(2).
125 Id. §§ 1301, 1302(c)(2).
126 See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
127 "It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascertain-
able, and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it
practicable to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, assess-
ment, and collection capable of practical operation." Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282
U.S. 359, 365 (1931). See note 14 and accompanying text Supra.
128 The early prototypes of the current averaging provisions required the taxpayer to
recompute his tax liability for the eailier years, during which his income was reduced
because of the injury, by apportioning the damage recovery among those years. But even
these prototypes did not allow the taxpayer to average the recovery over future years of
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practical matter, the taxpayer might not have funds available to
pay the tax when it became due in the future years.
A more feasible solution would require that the taxpayer ini-
tially compute and pay his tax in the year of recovery in accord
with the current averaging provisions. After a fixed period, e.g.,
five years, 2 9 the taxpayer would file a second return on which he
would recompute his tax on the recovery for lost earnings by av-
eraging the amount of the recovery equally over either a new av-
eraging period of ten years or the period during which the injury
actually reduced his earnings, whichever period was shorter. In the
example under discussion, the taxpayer would file the second re-
turn in 1983 and would average out the recovery over the period
of actual injury (1976-1980), since that period is shorter than the
ten-year averaging period (1973-1982). If the recomputation re-
sulted in a lower tax liability130 than incurred in 1977 because of
the inclusion (with averaging) of the recovery in that year, the
taxpayer would receive a refund. A liberalized averaging provision
for damages of this type would counter one of the few possible
arguments against taxing damages for loss of earnings caused by
personal injury. It would also provide needed relief to the taxpayer
who recovers for a business injury and finds himself with consider-
ably less after-tax income because of progression than he would
have had without the injury.
V
SOLICITUDE FOR THE TORTFEASOR
It is ironic that the tax exemption for lost earnings recoveries
in personal injury cases has been explained in terms of protecting
reduced earnings. See Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 804, § 1(a), 69 Stat. 688 (now I.R.C.
§ 1304); Act of Aug. 26, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-165, § 1, 71 Stat. 413 (now I.R.C. § 1305); Act
of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 58(a), 72 Stat. 1646 (originally enacted as I.R.C.
§ 1306) (repealed 1964).
129 This is a purely arbitrary period, admittedly subject to serious criticism. If, for
example, an individual is 20 years old when injured and the damage award is meant to
compensate for loss of earnings over his lifetime, averaging the award over 10 years, rather
than five, is still not much help, A line must be drawn, however, and 10 years is preferable to
five. But if the Service would extend the period further, or reopen the return twice, e.g.,
after five years and again after 15, the result would be even better.
130 Averaging the recovery over the period of actual injury may result in a higher tax
liability. In the example under discussion, if the taxpayer's income increases significantly
from 1978 through 1980, the second averaging may produce a higher liability. Arguably, the
Service is entitled to the increase, but because it has had the use of the taxpayer's tax
payment for five years, its claim to more revenue is less compelling. There are limita-
tions to the requirement of mathematical precision.
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tortfeasors from unfairly high judgments.131 Consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical situation. Suppose damages for lost earnings
were fully taxable in the year of receipt. Suppose also that a vic-
tim, anticipating average earnings of $100,000 per annum over
the ten remaining years of his life expectancy, sues a tortfeasor
who negligently caused an injury resulting in permanent loss of
earning capacity. Without the injury, the total value of the lost
earnings would have been $1,000,000, on which the victim would
have incurred tax liability of $451,800,132 leaving a net after-tax
income of approximately $550,000. Suppose that the jury is aware
that the injured party's recovery is now fully taxable in the
year of receipt.' 33 A clever member of the jury takes out his
slide rule and, to the astonishment of his fellow jurors, proves
that the victim must be given approximately $1,730,000 to re-
ceive an after-tax recovery of $550,000.134 He convinces his fel-
low jurors to make the victim whole 35 by awarding a judgment
,3' See B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 95-96
(1972).
132 I.R.C. § l(a) (a yearly tax of $45,180 on taxeble income of $100,000). This assumes,
again, that the victim's entire gross income would be taxable income and that he would have
no income other than his earnings. See note 109 supra. The analysis would be essentially the
same even if these assumptions were changed.
133 Whether a jury should be instructed that personal injury awards are not taxable
under present law has been much debated. Compare Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal
Injury Awards, 19 OIo ST. L.J. 212, 231-38 (1958) and Comment, Personal Inuiy Awards and
the Nonexistent Income Tax-What is a Proper Jury Charge?, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 98 (1957) (both
supporting such instruction) with 33 B.U.L. Rev. 114, 116 (1953) (opposing such instruc-
tion). Cases in the United States have gone both ways. Compare Dempsey v. Thompson, 363
Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952) (instruction required) with Hall v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955) (instruction refused).
The British approach the problem differently. If a recovery is nontaxable, the amount
of the award is reduced by the amount of taxes that the plaintiff would have been required
to pay on the lost earnings. British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, [1956] A.C. 185. This rule,
which gives the defendant the benefit of the tax exemption, has been severely criticized.
Dworkin, supra note 84, at 322-30; Jolowicz, Damages and Income Tax, 1959 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
86.
The question of a proper jury charge on the tax exemption is not within the scope of
this Article, especially because I have concluded that damages in compensation for loss of
earnings should be taxed. In the hypothetical under discussion, it is assumed that the jury
will regard damages for loss of earnings as taxable like any other form of income. This is a
reasonable assumption since some authorities believe that juries, despite the current exemp-
tion, assume that damages are taxable. See, e.g., Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Re-
coveries and the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274 (1960); Comment, Income Tax Effects
on Personal Injury Recoveries, 30 LA. L. REV. 672, 688 (1970).
,34 I.R.C. § l(a) (tax on $1,730,000 of approximately $1,182,000, leaving after-tax in-
come of $548,000). This assumes the victim is married and files a joint return. See id.
§ 143.
135 Compensating the injured party for his loss is the primary purpose of tort dam-
ages. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
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of $1,730,000.136
Because of the progressive tax structure, the injured party
needs a considerably higher pre-tax recovery to equal the after-tax
income he would have earned had he not been disabled. Thus, the
tortfeasor is, in effect, giving the government a tax windfall,' 3
unless he is able to take a deduction for the judgment 138 and has
income against which to apply the deduction.139 It would be unfair
to require a tortfeasor to pay a judgment embracing not only the
victim's usual taxes on his lost earnings, but also a vastly higher tax
liability resulting from progressive tax rates on a recovery repre-
senting income lost over a period of years. If liberalized averaging
provisions were enacted to mitigate the inequitable effects of
progression,14" both the victim's tax liability and the tortfeasor's
consequent damage liability would be reduced in the hypothetical
under discussion. 14  The tortfeasor would be required to make
both the injured party and the government whole, and usually not
much more.142 Under liberalized averaging, therefore, solicitude
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, the mathematically inclined juror is
on firm ground in wanting to make the victim whole. See text accompanying notes 216-17
infra.
136 For the purpose of analysis, the possible advantage or disadvantage of receiving the
recovery at the time of the settlement or judgment, rather than when the victim would
have made his earnings, is ignored.
137 In the example under discussion, the windfall may be as high as $730,000-i.e., the
difference between the tax that the victim would pay on his recovery ($1,182,000) and the
amount of taxes he would have paid on his earnings ($451,800). See notes 132 & 134 supra.
138 The tortfeasor would be able to take a deduction if, for example, the payment of
the judgment or settlement were an "ordinary and necessary" business expense. I.R.C.
§ 162(a). If the tortfeasor is insured, the insurance company would, of course, be able to
deduct its payment of the judgment as a business expense. In this case, the government
would not receive a tax windfall, except possibly to the extent that the insurance company's
marginal tax rate is less than that of the victim.
139 To the extent that the tortfeasor's income does not equal the amount of the deduc-
tion, the government gets a tax windfall because the victim is taxed fully on the recovery.
However, the tortfeasor does not get the full tax benefit from the deduction unless he can
use the excess of the deduction over his income as a net operating loss carryback or car-
ryforward to another taxable year. See I.R.C. § 172.
141 See notes 108-30 and accompanying text supra.
141 Under the liberalized averaging proposal, the victim would eventually be able to
spread out the recovery over 10 taxable years. See notes 129-30 and accompanying text
supra. To make the injured party whole, the jury would have to assure him an income after
averaging over 10 years of $550,000 ($55,000 a year). See note 132 and accompanying text
supra. Assuming that he continues to be taxed on the joint return basis, his yearly taxable
income would have to be $100,000 to produce an after-tax income of approximately
$55,000. See I.R.C. § 1(a). Thus, the jury would have to award $1,000,000 to give him the
same after-tax income as he would have had-considerably less than the award necessary
to make him whole without liberalized averaging. See notes 134-36 and accompanying text
supra.
142 Even under my suggested revision of the averaging provisions for damages, it is
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for the tortfeasor would not provide a persuasive justification for
exempting lost earning recoveries from taxation.
VI
ANTITRUST DAMAGES
In a private suit under the Sherman1 43 or Clayton Acts,' 44 a
victim of an antitrust violation may recover profits lost because of
the injury. In addition, the injured party may receive treble dam-
ages as a penalty for the wrongful conduct. 45 The taxation of
these elements of a recovery presents some interesting tax policy
issues.
A. Punitive Damages
Under Glenshaw Glass, punitive damages in an antitrust action
are taxable in full as ordinary income. 146 This rule has been criti-
cized by one commentator 147 who has argued that punitive dam-
ages should receive favorable tax treatment to ensure that the pol-
icy behind the treble damage provisions-namely, to encourage
private suits against antitrust violators1 48 -will not be thwarted by a
tax disincentive.' 49 The existence of valid policy reasons for grant-
ing favorable tax treatment to punitive damages in antitrust actions
does not mean that Glenshaw Glass was wrongly decided-it is Con-
gress' responsibility, not the Court's, to make such policy determi-
nations. Congress was responsible for enacting the treble damage
possible that the victim's tax liability on the recovery will be greater than it would have
been had the injury not occurred. See text accompanying notes 129-30 supra. If the victim
does have a greater tax liability and if the award compensates for this increased liability,
the wrongdoer is making the government somewhat more than "whole."
143 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
144 Id. §§ 12-27.
145 Id. § 15 (1970).
146 348 U.S. at 431.
147 Wright, supra note 4, at 247-49. Wright argues that despite the recovery of treble
damages, it was too expensive to bring many private actions even before Glenshaw Glass.
Among the major problems facing plaintiffs are the difficulty of proving the full amount
of damages, the time and trouble of bringing suits, and the failure to fully recover in a
court award the legal expenses of bringing suit. Id. at 249-50.
145 Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); S. REP. No. 619,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955), reprinted in [1955] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2328,
2330; REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws 378 (1955).
149 Wright, supra note 4, at 256-57.
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incentive, and it is best able to determine how great the incentive
should be-i.e., whether punitive damages should be fully taxable,
fully exempt, or taxable at some favorable rate.150 In making that
determination, one consideration might be that an increase in the
number of private actions could diminish the need for govern-
ment intervention against antitrust violators. Thus, Congress could
weigh the revenue loss resulting from a tax break for punitive
damages against possible savings in government antitrust enforce-
ment costs. 151 More broadly, Congress would have to determine
whether the gains from increased competition, possibly resulting
from a greater threat of private suits, are worth the net budget cost
of favorable tax treatment. 152
There are, however, a number of serious objections to singling
out punitive antitrust damages for special treatment. Since punitive
damages are disposable income subject to the recipient's control
-just as profits or salary income' 53-the policy justifications should
be convincing before Congress grants favorable tax treatment.
In addition, the proponents of a statutory revision of Glenshaw
Glass must counter the argument that windfalls such as punitive
damages should be taxed at least as heavily as other forms of in-
"" Wright made two suggestions for favorable treatment: either tax only two-thirds of
a treble damage antitrust recovery, or tax punitive damages as if they were long-term
capital gains. Wright, supra note 4, at 256. The effect of the first proposal is to tax fully the
one-third of a recovery that represents compensation for lost profits and to tax the two-
thirds that represent punitive damages at one-half of the usual rates on ordinary income.
For individuals, the net result of this proposal on the taxation of punitive damages would
be similar to the effect of the 50% deduction for capital gains. See I.R.C. § 1202. For
corporations normally taxed at a 48% rate, the net result would be a tax rate of 24% on
punitive damages. See I.R.C. § 1 (b)(2), (c)(3).
The second suggestion is easier to analyze. In the case of corporations, punitive dam-
ages would be taxed at a maximum rate of 30%-the tax rate for corporations on capital
gains. I.R.C. § 1201(a). In the case of individuals, punitive damages either would be taxed
at the optional 25% rate on capital gains up to $50,000 (I.R.C. § 1201(b), (d)), or would be
deductible to the extent of one-half the net capital gain (I.R.C. § 1202). For both corpora-
tions and individuals, punitive damages would be subject to the minimum tax on tax pref-
erence items. I.R.C. § 57(a)(9).
"1' For the argument that an increase in the number of private suits may reduce gov-
ernment enforcement costs, see Study of Monopoly Power-Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3408, ser. 1, pt. 3,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1951) (statement of H. Graham Morison, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in charge of the Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice).
152 For a general discussion of the use of a tax expenditure rather than a direct ex-
penditure to achieve a non-tax policy goal, see Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies"
in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAx. J. 244 (1969); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison 'vith Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 705 (1970).
'
3 See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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come, since it is less likely that taxing windfalls will reduce socially
productive economic incentives.' 54 Finally, Congress should hesi-
tate before extending favored treatment to one class of litigants,
when other classes may have an equal claim to special tax status. 15
5
B. Compensatory Damages
Damages received in an antitrust action as compensation for
lost profits are taxable as ordinary income. Section 186 of the
Code, however, added by the 1969 Tax Reform Act,156 applies a
tax-benefit principle 57 to reduce or eliminate the tax on such a
recovery under certain circumstances. Under section 186 a tax-
payer is allowed to deduct an amount equal to the compensatory
damage amount,15 8 if during the years affected by the antitrust
violation the taxpayer had net operating losses in an amount
greater than or equal to the amount of the compensatory damages,
and if these net operating losses were not absorbed in carryovers
or carrybacks.15 9 If the amount of such net operating losses is less
than the recovery, the lesser amount may be deducted.16°1
A simplified example may help explain the operation of sec-
tion 186. An antitrust violation occurs during the years 1970-1974,
154 Windfalls, by definition, are not acquired by any effort on the part of the recipient.
See Comment, supra note 103, at 748. Thus, taxation of windfalls should not interfere with
economic incentive.
155 Based on some of Wright's arguments (see note 147 supra), one might conclude that
all awards of punitive damages should be nontaxable. Punitive damages are awarded partly
to deter wrongdoing. If punitive damage recoveries were exempt, the incentive to sue would
be enhanced, thereby increasing the possibility of deterring potential wrongdoers. It is
doubtful, however, whether the actual deterrent effect is so beneficial, or the budgetary cost
so small, that recipients of punitive damage awards, unlike other taxpayers, should be
allowed to enjoy an increase in their disposable income with no tax liability to the govern-
ment. See text accompanying notes 230-32 infra.
1-1 Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 904(a), 83 Stat. 711 (1969) (codified at I.R.C. § 186).
157 The term "tax benefit" usually refers to the doctrine that the return of an amount
deducted in a previous year will be included in income only if the previous deduction gave
rise to a "tax benefit." See note 75 supra. Nonetheless, the operation of § 186 is sufficiently
similar to warrant the use of the term "tax benefit." The Senate Report on the 1969 Tax
Reform Act described the operation of the provision in terms of a tax benefit: "[A] special
deduction is to be allowed which has the effect of reducing the amounts required to be
included in income to the extent that the losses to which they relate did not give rise to a tax
benefit." S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 278, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2027, 2316. The Conference Report adopted the same language. CONF. REP. No.
782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 332, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2392, 2448.
158 I.R.C. § 186(a)(1).
159 Id. § 186(d)(1), (2).
", Id. § 186(a)(2).
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costing the taxpayer $50,000 in yearly income. Assume that the
taxpayer had net operating losses of $40,000 each year from 1970
through 1974. In 1980 the taxpayer recovers a $250,000 judgment
to compensate for the lost profits. This judgment would be includ-
able in the taxpayer's 1980 income. Assuming that the net operat-
ing losses were not absorbed as carrybacks or carryovers in other
taxable years, 161 the taxpayer may deduct $200,000 from his
income-i.e., the amount of the earlier net operating losses-
thereby reducing his taxable income from the compensatory dam-
age award to $50,000.162
Although the operation of section 186 is somewhat compli-
cated, its purpose is simple. Compensatory damages should be tax-
able when the lost profits for which they compensate would also
have been taxable. To the extent that the profits would have been
offset by net operating losses, the compensatory damages should
also be offset. Section 186 accomplishes this result.
In addition to antitrust recoveries, the section applies to dam-
ages received for infringement of a United States patent 63 and to
damages received for breach of contract or breach of a fiduciary
duty.' 64 It is hard to see why Congress has limited the provision to
these types of damages. As a general rule, it would seem that
damages for lost profits should be exempt from taxation whenever
the profits for which the damages are meant to compensate would
not have been taxed because of net operating losses in the year or
years of the injury. 165
161 Generally, a taxpayer may carry back a net operating loss to each of the three
taxable years preceding the taxable year of the loss and may carry forward a net oper-
ating loss to each of the seven taxable years following the taxable year of the loss. I.R.C.
§ 172(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(B).
162 1d. § 186(a)(2).
163 Id. § 186(b)(1).
164 Id. § 186(b)(2).
"s Currently, § 186 operates only retroactively--i.e., the taxpayer gets a deduction only
if there were unused net operating losses in years prior to the year in which he receives the
damage award. Id. § 186(d)(2) ("injury period" defined in past tense). Theoretically, if there
are net operating losses in future years, and if the damage award compensates for loss of
earnings in those years, the deduction should be available. This is another area in which
simplicity of administration, particularly the annual accounting principle, may prevail over
sound tax policy. See notes 14 & 127 and accompanying text supra. A possible compromise
between sound theory and simplicity of administration would allow a taxpayer, who has
received an award compensating for loss of future earnings, to readjust his income after
some fixed period in accordance with the principles of § 186. Such a procedure would
resemble the liberalized averaging proposal suggested earlier in this Article. See notes 129-30
and accompanying text supra.
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VII
TAXATION AND THE PURPOSES OF DAMAGES
AWARDED FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Although it is sometimes broadly stated that damages for
breach of contract are income, 166 the following examples will show
that this general rule should be subject to exception.
A. Reliance Damages
Under certain circumstances, the victim of a breach of contract
may recover from the breaching party the expenses incurred in
reliance on the contract.6 7 Such damages are taxable, whether
they represent damages in compensation for essential reliance ex-
penses or for incidental reliance expenses.' 68 The taxation of such
damages rests on the assumption that the reliance expenses were
incurred and deducted in prior years.' 69 If this assumption is cor-
rect, the damages are properly taxable.7  If, however, the ex-
penses were not deductible, 1 7 the damages ought not be taxable,172
since a tax would in effect be a tax on the injured party's capital.' 73
Assuming the expenses were properly deductible, the recov-
ery is apparently taxable 74 even when the taxpayer received no tax
benefit from the deduction, because of net losses in the earlier
years. 175 This result is proper under current law because section
186 of the Code will enable the injured party to deduct net operat-
ing losses incurred in the year affected by the breach of contract
from any damage recovery on the breach, even when the net
operating losses could not otherwise be carried forward to the year
of recovery.' 76
166 See Plumb, supra note 3, at 222.
167 The leading article analyzing the award of reliance damages is Fuller & Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).16
' See Plumb, supra note 3, at 222-23.
16 9 Id.
170 See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
171 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 262-263.
172 If the expenses are capital expenditures that increase the taxpayer's basis in an asset,
the damages, when received, ought to reduce the taxpayer's basis in the asset.173 See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
174 See Plumb, supra note 3, at 223 n. 14.
175 Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
176 See notes 156-62, 164 and accompanying text supra. One minor problem with the
operation of § 186 in this context is that the taxpayer gets the benefit only of net operating
losses within the "injury period," which is defined as "the period during which amounts
would have been received or accrued but for the breach of contract." I.R.C. § 186(d)(2)(B).
Thus, if the expenses were incurred in a year before amounts were due under the contract,
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B. Restitution Damages
In certain cases when one party breaches a contract, the in-
jured party may recover restitution damages-i.e., the benefits con-
ferred on the breaching party by the injured party's performance
under the contract. 177 If the expenses and costs incurred by the
plaintiff in performing the contract were deductible, the full
amount of restitution damages ought to be taxed to him. Since
restitution damages are intended to force the defendant to dis-
gorge the benefits received under the contract,1 78 such damages
are, in a tax sense, similar to a windfall 7 9 to the plaintiff and, like
windfalls generally, should be taxable.'80 Since section 186 is ap-
plicable to damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff should be
taxed on the entire recovery (provided that his expenses were de-
ductible), even if the deduction for the expenses produced no tax
benefit originally because of net operating losses in the years af-
fected by the injury.' 8' If the expenses incurred in performing the
contract were not deductible, the restitution damages ought to be
taxable only to the extent that they exceed the plaintiff's non-
deductible expenses.' 8 2 This result will assure that no tax is im-
posed on the injured party's capital.' 83
C. Expectation Damages
The basic principle of expectation damage awards is to put the
nonbreaching party in the position he would have been in had the
contract been performed.'8 4 The following examples illustrate how
appropriate rules for taxing such damages can ensure that the
injured party receives the benefit of his bargain.
1. Employment Contracts
If an employer breaches an agreement to employ or to pay a
certain wage to an employee, the employee can generally recover
§ 186 might not help the taxpayer if he did not have net operating losses in the injury
period.
177 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.1, at 791-95 (1973), for a
general discussion on the recovery of restitution damages.178 1d. at 791-92.
179 The contract price may in some cases set an upper limit on the recovery and,
therefore, on the amount of the windfall. See Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitu-
tionfor Defendant's Breach, 20 OHmO ST. L.J. 264 (1959).
Ill See text accompanying notes 9 & 106-07 supra.
181 See text accompanying notes 156-65 supra.
182 But if the expenses increase the taxpayer's basis in an asset, his basis ought to be
reduced to the extent of the damages. See note 172 supra.
183 See text accompanying notes 52-54, 58-63 & 173 supra.
1'84 See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1002 (1964).
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the difference between the contract price for his services and the
amount he earns in a new job, or, alternatively, the amount the
employer can prove the employee could earn by reasonable effort
in a new job.'18 5 These damages are properly taxable to the em-
ployee, since his salary would have been taxable if the employer
had not breached the contract. Taxing the damages is therefore
consistent with giving the nonbreaching employee the benefit of
his bargain with the employer.' 86
If the employee breaches the contract, the employer can re-
cover expectation damages measured by any additional cost in-
curred in obtaining substitute services.'8 7 Since this additional cost
is deductible by the employer, 88 it is proper to tax damages re-
ceived in compensation for such deductible expenses. The net ef-
fect of including the damages in gross income and allowing a
deduction for the increased costs is a tax wash that will put the
employer in exactly the same position he would have been in had
the contract been performed. 8 9
2. Construction Contracts
If a contractor breaches a construction contract, the injured
party will usually recover either the cost of finishing construction
in accordance with the contract, or the difference between the
value of the improvement bargained for under the contract and
the value of the improvement actually received from the contrac-
tor's performance.'" If the injured party's recovery equals the
amount necessary to complete the project, and he uses the recov-
ery to complete construction (or has already incurred the costs in
completing construction), the most sensible tax result would be to
reduce his basis in the completed building by the amount of the
damages. This reduction in basis will place the injured party in
exactly the same position he would have been in had the contract
been performed.' 9 ' If the injured party receives damages meas-
185 See D. DOBBS, supra note 177, § 12.25, at 924-25.
86 In addition, more liberalized averaging provisions would ensure that the wronged
employee is not taxed more heavily because of income-bunching than he would have been
had the contract been performed. See text accompanying notes 108-30 supra and notes
227-28 infra.
187 See D. DOBBS, supra note 177, § 12.26, at 932.
188 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
189 This assumes that the employer has also been awarded interest to compensate for
the loss of the use of his money during the period between the date of the payment of
additional compensation and the date of the recovery. Such interest will be taxable (see
note 13 supra), as would the income his money would have earned but for the injury.
198 See D. DOBBS, supra note 177, § 12.21.
191 To take a simple example, assume the injured party pays S10,000 for the building
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ured by the cost of completion, but chooses not to complete the
project, it is less appropriate to insist that the tax consequences
reflect the "benefit of the bargain" principle because the injured
party has effectively opted against fulfilling the bargain. In receiv-
ing damages measured by the cost of completion, without actually
incurring those costs, the injured party has recovered an amount
resembling a windfall which should properly be taxable in full as
ordinary income.1 9
2
The same principles apply when the injured party receives
damages measured by the "difference in value" formula. Assume
that he bargained for a building worth $100,000, but received a
building worth $75,000, and that his recovery is therefore $25,000.
Let us assume that the contract required the injured party to pay
$100,000 for the building. Given these facts, the proper tax result
would be to reduce his cost basis ($100,000) in the building by the
amount of damages received ($25,000), thereby arriving at an ad-
justed basis of $75,000. If the injured party subsequently sells the
building for its value of $75,000, he will have no taxable gain, a
result accurately reflecting his tax situation. Since the amount of
the damages is offset by the decrease in the worth of the building,
the taxpayer has had no real economic gain. 193
Let us change the hypothetical so that the contract price is
$80,000-i.e', the injured party originally receives the better of the
bargain in the sense that he is paying $80,000 for a building worth
$100,000 upon completion. If he receives $25,000 in damages
based on the difference in value formula, it is interesting to specu-
under the contract and incurs additional costs of $2,000 in completing the building. These
additional costs would increase his basis to $12,000. If he recovers damages of $2,000, his
basis would be reduced to $10,000-his basis in the building had the contract been prop-
erly performed.
19'See text accompanying notes 9 & 106-07 supra. The same rule should apply to any
excess of the injured party's recovery over his actual cost of completion. Thus in the ex-
ample in note 191 supra, if the injured party's additional costs are only $1,000, his basis will
be reduced by $1,000, and the remaining $1,000 of damages will be includable in his gross
income.
193 One alternative tax scenario might include the $25,000 recovery in the taxpayer's
income, while allowing him to retain a basis of $100,000 in the building. Upon a subse-
quent sale of the building for its $75,000 value, the taxpayer would show a loss of $25,000.
This alternative, quite unfavorable to the taxpayer, would deprive him of the benefit of the
bargain for three reasons. First, it would result in the addition of $25,000 to his income
when he would have had no immediate income had the contract been performed. Second,
the damages would be ordinary income since there would be no sale or exchange (see note
70 and accompanying text supra), but the loss upon a subsequent sale would be treated as a
capital loss, less easily deductible than an ordinary loss. I.R.C. § 1211. Third, if the build-
ing were used by the taxpayer for personal purposes, his loss on a subsequent sale would
not be deductible at all. I.R.C. § 165(c).
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late on the taxation of the damages. It is arguable that the injured
party has realized a taxable gain of $20,000 measured by the dif-
ference between the value of the building acquired ($75,000) plus
the damages ($25,000), and his cost in the building ($80,000). Yet
the gain results not from the breach, but from the bargain itself.
Thus the taxpayer has a strong argument against immediate taxa-
tion of this gain, since the gain would not have been taxed im-
mediately if the contract had been performed and the taxpayer
had obtained a $100,000 building for $80,000. In addition, if the
gain were taxed immediately it would probably be taxed as ordi-
nary income rather than capital gain because there has been no
sale or exchange. 194 But if the contract had been fully performed
and the taxpayer had received a building worth $100,000 for
$80,000, his gain on a subsequent sale would usually be taxed
under the more favorable rules for capital gains. 195
To give the injured party the full benefit of his bargain, there-
fore, it seems proper to reduce his cost basis of $80,000 by the
amount of the damages ($25,000), producing an adjusted basis of
$55,000.'9 Upon a subsequent sale of the building for its value
($75,000), the injured party would have a gain of $20,000, pre-
sumably taxable at capital gains rates. Reducing the basis, rather
than taxing the damages immediately, would therefore place the
injured party in approximately' 97 the same position as he would
have been in had the contract been performed.
3. Contracts to Purchase or Sell Land
If a seller breaches a contract to sell land, the buyer may seek
remedies such as specific performance, or expectation damages
measured by the difference between the market value of the land
194 See notes 64-71 and accompanying text supra.
195 See I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1202, 1221, 1231.
196 An interesting case that adopted the reduction-of-basis technique was Henri Chou-
teau, 22 B.T.A. 850 (1931), in which the taxpayer-buyer successfully reduced his basis
in the purchased stock by an amount equal to a damage recovery representing the differ-
ence in value between the stock as promised and the stock as received. The court rejected
the Commissioner's argument that the damages were includable immediately in the tax-
payer's gross income.
197 Arguably, under this approach the injured party would be in a somewhat better
position by having the immediate use of the $20,000 in damages, and he would not be
taxed until he actually realized a gain by selling the property for $75,000. On the other
hand, had the contract been performed, the taxpayer would have had the use of property
worth $20,000 more than the property actually received. In any case, the alternative of
taxing the damages immediately as ordinary income puts the injured party in a signifi-
cantly worse position than he would have been in had the contract been performed.
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and the contract price. 198 If the buyer gets specific performance,
no immediate tax consequences should follow-the buyer simply
takes as his basis in the land the purchase price' 99 and computes
his gain or loss upon subsequent sale accordingly.
If the buyer succeeds in recovering expectation damages, the
proper tax consequences are less obvious. Assume the contract
price was $100,000 and the land was worth $120,000, giving the
buyer damages of $20,000. If the buyer has not acquired substitute
property by the time of the recovery, the damages ought to be
taxed as ordinary income because in the absence of a substitute
purchase the damages resemble a windfall.2 0 0 But if the buyer has
acquired replacement property for $120,000, his claim to a reduc-
tion in the basis of the property acquired by the amount of the
damages is strong. Reducing the basis would mean that the dam-
ages would not be taxed immediately as ordinary income, but
would be taxed upon a subsequent sale of the property for its
value,20 ' presumably as a capital gain.20 2 These tax results give the
buyer the full benefit of his bargain since he would not have been
taxed immediately on his profit from the bargain had the land
been conveyed in accordance with the contract.203
When the buyer breaches his contract to purchase land, the
seller can generally recover expectation damages measured by the
difference between the contract price and the market value of the
land.20 4 One case holds that such damages are taxable immediately
as ordinary income,20 5 but at least three other tax results are possi-
ble. First, the damages may be taxable as a capital gain20 6 (assum-
ing the land is a capital asset); second, the damages may reduce the
seller's basis in the property;207 or, third, the damages may be
198 See D. DOBBS, supra note 177, § 12.7. In certain cases consequential damages may
also be recovered. Id. § 12.8, at 841-42.
199 I.R.C. § 1012.
2 0 See text accompanying notes 9 & 106-07 supra.
201 The taxpayer's basis would be $100,000, his amount realized $120,000, and his gain
$20,000. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (b).
20 2 1d. §§ 1201, 1202, 1221, 1231.
203 He would be taxed only when and if he "realized" the profit. Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U.S. 189 (1920).
204 See D. DOBBS, supra note 177, § 12.7. In certain cases, consequential damages may
also be recovered. Id. § 12.11.
210 See Gerald Melone, 45 T.C. 501, 507-08 (1966).
206 Cf. Alvin B. Lowe, 44 T.C. 363, 374-75 (1965) (damages held taxable as capital
gain).
207 In the Lowe case the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that his basis in the
property should have been reduced by an amount equal to the damage recovery. Id. at
372-73.
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added to the amount realized when the seller sells the property.
For various reasons the last alternative seems to be the proper tax
result.
Taxing the damages as a capital gain is improper because the
taxpayer-seller has not engaged in a capital asset transaction. 2 8
Although this Article has previously criticized the rule that requires
a sale or exchange for capital asset treatment,2 9 a minimum re-
quirement for capital gain treatment should be that the taxpayer
part with the capital asset either voluntarily (by a sale or exchange)
or involuntarily (through conversion or destruction).
Reducing the seller's basis in the property is equally unsound.
Unlike the owner in the construction contract example, or the
buyer who recovers damages from a breaching seller,211 the seller
has not actually reduced his cost in the property by recovering
expectation damages from the buyer. In those earlier examples the
owner and the buyer may justifiably reduce their bases by the
amount of the damages because the other party's breach increased
their costs beyond the price set by the contract. Such reasoning
does not apply to a seller who recovers damages from a breaching
buyer.
The most sensible tax result has the seller treat the damages as
part of the amount realized upon a subsequent sale of the prop-
erty. Assume that the contract price was $120,000, the fair market
value of the property was $100,000, and the seller's basis was
$90,000. Assume also that upon the buyer's breach the seller sells
the property to another purchaser for $100,000, producing a gain
of $10,000 which is presumably taxable as a capital gain.21' When
the seller recovers expectation damages of $20,000, the damages
would be treated as an increase in the amount realized and taxed
as an additional capital gain of $20,000.212 Including the damages
in the amount realized generally puts the seller in the same posi-
tion he would have been in had the contract been performed. If
the buyer had performed, the seller would have realized the pur-
218 See Gerald Melone, 45 T.C. 501, 507-08 (1966); Ralph A. Boatman, 32 T.C. 1188,
1191-92 (1959). But see Alvin B. Lowe, 44 T.C. 363, 373-75 (1965).
209 See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
2 10 See notes 190-92, 200-03 and accompanying textsupra.
211 This gain will be taxed as a capital gain if the asset is a capital asset. I.R.C. §§ 1202,
1221, 1222.
212 Absent a "sale or exchange" at the time of the recovery, the recovery may be tax-
able as ordinary income. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra. But when the damages
are added to. the amount realized, they ought to be taxed in the same way as the original
transaction to which they relate, i.e., as a capital gain. Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344
U.S. 6 (1952).
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chase price of $120,000, producing a capital gain of $30,000.213
Treating the damages as part of the amount realized ultimately
results in an equal amount of capital gain.214 One difference, of
course, is that the seller is not taxed on the full amount of the gain
until he recovers the damages, but this difference is unavoidable
since it is impossible to determine the amount of the gain, or in-
deed, whether there is a gain, until the seller recovers his damages.
In the above examples it has been assumed that the seller sold
the property to another buyer after the breach. But if the seller
does not sell the property, it is less appropriate to apply the "ben-
efit of the bargain" principle for tax purposes, because the seller
has in effect opted against fulfilling his part of the contract. Where
the seller has not disposed of the land by the year of the recovery,
the damages resemble a windfall and should be taxed as ordinary
income.215
VIII
TAXATION AND THE PURPOSES OF TORT RECOVERIES
The rules proposed above for the taxation of damage re-
coveries are consistent with traditional tort-law principles. The
primary purpose of most tort recoveries is compensation of the
victim for losses caused by the tort.21 6 If a victim is awarded com-
pensatory damages exactly equal to the amount of his loss, then a
tax on the recovery may result in undercompensation of the victim.
Conversely, if the victim receives compensatory damages equal to
the amount of his gross earnings lost because of the injury, and if
no tax is levied on the recovery, then the victim may be overcom-
pensated for his loss (since his gross earnings would have been
taxed but for the injury).21 7
A. Pain and Suffering
When a judge or a jury sets damages for pain and suffering, it
is an attempt to quantify an intangible loss which the victim in-
curred as a consequence of tortious conduct. Although some com-
mentators question whether a monetary award can accurately re-
213 See I.R.C. § 1001.
214 Ten thousand dollars is taxable immediately upon sale of the property and $20,000
is taxable upon recovery of the damages.
215 See text accompanying notes 9 & 106-07 supra.
216 2 F. HARPER & F. JAIMES, supra note 135, § 25.1.
217 See id. § 25.12 (argument that present exemption for lost earning recoveries in
personal injury cases leads to overcompensation of victim).
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flect such a loss, 218 compensating the victim is, at least theoretically,
the purpose of the award.219 If the jury awards an appropriate
amount, a tax on the recovery will result in undercompensation of
the victim. Hence a tax exemption for pain and suffering damages
assures that the compensatory purpose of the award will be fully
effectuated.
B. Loss of Capital and Expenses
Capital is not taxed under the Internal Revenue Code.22 ' If an
award is intended to compensate a victim for loss of capital, taxa-
tion of the recovery will result in undercompensation, since the
victim's capital would not have been taxed had he not suffered the
loss. Damages in compensation for expenses incurred because of
the injury should likewise be exempt, since such damages consti-
tute a return of the victim's capital which would be intact but for
the injury. In both cases, the exemption from tax reinforces the
compensatory purpose of the damage award.
C. Loss of Earnings
The usual rule is that damages for loss of earnings are com-
puted on the basis of the gross income lost as a result of the
injury.221 Because of the current tax exemption for such damages,
a plaintiff will almost always be overcompensated for lost earn-
ings, since an award on the basis of gross income fails to account
for the income tax that the plaintiff would have paid on such
gross income.222
There are two solutions to this violation of the compensation
principle. The current British rule reduces the award by the
amount of tax that the victim would have paid on the lost earn-
ings. 223 This approach is somewhat objectionable because it is often
difficult to predict the taxes on a victim's gross earnings. More-
over, it is difficult to see any policy justification for giving the tort-
feasor, as opposed to the victim, the benefit of the exemption.22 4
Another solution, suggested earlier,2 25 is to tax the victim on
218 See, e.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 177, § 8.1, at 544-45.
219 See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 135, § 25.10. See also 4 RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 912, comment b (1939).
220 See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
221 See D. DoBBs, supra note 177, § 8.8, at 576.
222 See note 6 supra.
221 See note 133 supra for a discussion of the British approach.
224 See Dworkin, supra note 84, at 322-26 for an excellent presentation of the argu-
ments against the British rule.
22- See notes 129-30 and accompanying text supra.
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the amount of a recovery that compensates for loss of earnings.
Taxing the earnings would solve the overcompensation problem.
Furthermore, it would assure that the tortfeasor would fully com-
pensate losses of both the victim and the government.226
D. Averaging
Under current law, income averaging is not fully effective in
alleviating the problem of income-bunching caused by a large dam-
age recovery in one taxable year.227 To the extent that income-
bunching results in a higher tax than the victim would have paid
on profits lost because of an injury, the victim is not fully compen-
sated for his loss. In order to more fully effectuate the purpose
of compensatory tort awards, it will be necessary to liberalize the
current averaging rules for damage recoveries. 22 1
E. Section 186 and Net Operating Losses
Occasionally a victim will receive an award in compensation for
lost profits which would not have been taxed (or would have been
taxed at a lower rate) had the profits been received in the years
actually affected by the injury. This discrepancy will occur
whenever the victim has net operating losses in the year of the
injury which cannot be carried forward to the year of recovery.
Under these circumstances the victim's net recovery after taxes will
be less than it would have been had the injury not taken place.
Because of the vagaries of the tax law, therefore, the victim is not
made completely whole. Since this result violates the compensation
principle, section 186 of the Internal Revenue Code should be
expanded in order to extend to more tort victims the tax advan-
tages of net operating losses in years affected by the injury.229
F. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are generally designed to effectuate public
policy through civil action against wrongdoers. 2311 Such damages
are awarded apart from any compensatory damages and are not
intended to make the victim whole. Rather, punitive damages are
exemplary in nature; they are meant to penalize and deter wrong-
226 See notes 140-41 and accompanying text supra. One British commentator has ar-
gued that the British should adopt a gross earnings measure of damages and should tax
damages representing loss of earnings. See Dworkin, supra note 84, at 327-28.
227 See notes 117-25 and accompanying text supra.
228 See notes 126-30 and accompanying text supra.
229 See notes 156-65 and accompanying text supra.
230 See D. DOBBS, supra note 177, § 3.9, at 205.
19771
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ful conduct. This policy is not affected by taxation of the damages.
As long as the wrongdoer pays, the admonitory purpose of the
award is served-the amount actually retained by the victim is ir-
relevant.
One contrary consideration rests on the premise that punitive
damages provide an incentive to the victim to sue in cases where a
suit by a private individual, rather than the government, may be
desirable.2 31 The theory that the victim will be insufficiently en-
couraged to bring a socially desirable private action if the award
is taxed has already been discussed in the context of antitrust
suits. 232 As in the case of antitrust damages, proponents of favor-
able tax treatment of punitive damages generally bear the burden
of proving that special treatment will significantly increase the in-
centive of victims to sue. The current volume of litigation in which
plaintiffs seek punitive damages suggests that no further incentive
is necessary. Because taxing punitive damages offends no other
purpose for making such an award, the Supreme Court's decision
in Glenshaw Glass that such damages are taxable should not be
changed by statute.
CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed the policies that should underlie a
rational system for taxing damages. Most of the current tax rules
are supported by principles of tax policy. The current exemption
for lost earning recoveries in personal injury cases is difficult to
defend, however, and ought to be repealed.
The present rules for taxing damages are otherwise generally
consistent with the non-tax policies in the damage award area. To
the extent that the tax rules are inconsistent with non-tax policies,
changes can be made to harmonize the most important tax and non-
tax policies. However, tax legislation should not be expected to re-
flect all the non-tax purposes of damage recoveries. The fact that
taxation may impede a non-tax purpose-e.g., the incentive to
bring suit which the award of punitive damages provides-does
not of itself require that the tax rule be changed to effectuate the
non-tax policy. In some cases it may be inevitable that tax and non-
tax policies will conflict. In such cases, the proper tax rule should
yield only when Congress is convinced of the overriding impor-
tance of the conflicting non-tax objective.
231 Id.
22 See notes 146-55 and accompanying text supra.
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